The brain has many modular circuits that mediate different functions. Not all of these functions are part of conscious experience. When these modules related to conscious sensations get "crosswired," this leads to synesthesia. One would expect that similar joining of other cognitions is also possible. A deliberate method of achieving such a transition from many to one is a part of some meditative traditions.

It is significant that patients with disrupted brains never claim to have any-thing other than a unique awareness. The reductionists opine that consciousness is nothing but the activity in the brain but this is mere semantic play which sheds no light on the problem. If shared activity was all there was to conscious-ness, then this would have been destroyed or multiplied by commissurotomy. Split brains should then represent two minds just as in freak births with one trunk and two heads we do have two minds.

Consciousness, viewed as a non-material entity characterized by holistic quantum-like theory, becomes more understandable. The various senses are projections of the mindfunction along different directions. Injury to a specific location in the brain destroys the corresponding hardware necessary to reduce

the mindfunction in that direction. Mindfunction may be represented along many bases. Instead of aphasias and agnosias, one could have talked of other deficits. The architecture of mind adapts to the the environment. This adapta-tion makes it possible for the mind to compensate.

Gazzaniga has said: "consciousness is a feeling about specialized capac-ities." But why should this feeling of unity persist when the hemispheres are severed? I believe the fact that commisurotomy does not disrupt the cogni-tive or verbal intelligence of the patients is an argument against reductionism. One must grant that the severed hemispheres maintain a feeling of unity, which manifests as consciousness, by some fundamental field.

The argument that one of the two hemispheres does not have language and consciousness is uniquely associated with language fails when we consider split-brain patients who had language in both the hemispheres. It is a suggests that the right hemisphere, although possessing language, is very poor at mak-ing simple inferences. He reasons that the two hemispheres have very dissimilar conscious experience. But the fact that both the hemispheres have speech mit-igates against that view. Furthermore, one would expect that the separated hemispheres will start a process of independent reorganization to all the sen-sory inputs. If the patient still is found to have a single awareness, as has been the case in all tests, then the only conclusion is that the mind remains whole although the brain has been sundered.